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Several recent papers in the field of
Evolution and Human Behavior rely on
aggregate data when testing their hypoth-
esis on adaptations in humans. This is
perhaps most notably the case for stud-
ies on pathogen stress, (e.g., DeBruine
et al., 2010; Thornhill and Fincher, 2011;
Fincher and Thornhill, 2012). These stud-
ies predominantly rely on cross-cultural
correlations and present p-values in sup-
port of their hypotheses. In this opinion
article, I demonstrate why p-values can
be questionable in this context. I do not
wish to single out a particular research
area, as the misinterpretation of p in this
context seems relatively widespread. But
for the purpose of this opinion article I
will largely draw on examples from work
relating to pathogen stress, as this research
area most prominently appears to rely on
aggregated cross-cultural data. I also want
to stress that this is not a general critique
of p-value usage or frequentist statistics
(e.g., Johnson, 1999; Anderson et al., 2000;
Goodman, 2008; Ziliak and McCloskey,
2008; Wetzels et al., 2011), but rather a
critique on the reliance on p-values when
using macrolevel data in cases where the
sample closely matches the entire range of
possible observations. This opinion arti-
cle is also not a critique of reliance on
macrolevel data per se, or of a research pro-
gramme in particular, but focuses on one
particular aspect: statistical inference from
macrolevel data when a sample closely
matches the entire population.
INFERENTIAL STATISTICS
As is commonly documented (e.g.,
Howell, 2010), inferential statistics are
used when based on a finite sample set of
observations, we want to make statistical
inferences on the “population” of obser-
vations via comparing these to known
statistical distributions (e.g., Spatz, 2007).
For example, with a one-sample t-test,
we can test whether the population mean
of adult male heights from Amsterdam
differs from a given value (e.g., 170 cm)
based on a given set of observations, a
sample of Amsterdammers’ heights (see
Myers, 2009). The sample of male heights
we obtained is compared to a known
statistical distribution (t or Z distribu-
tion, in this case). This comparison gives
us a p-value, which allows to reject the
null hypothesis of no statistical difference
between the proposed value of 170 cm and
the “true” population mean. A p < 0.05
thus would allow us to reject the null
hypothesis that the population mean is
not statistically different from the hypoth-
esized value of 170 cm, at a 5% significance
level.
Similarly to a one sample t-test, when
making statistical inferences on a Pearson
correlation coefficient, we aim to reject the
null hypothesis of no association between
two given variables in the population
based on a (randomized) sample drawn
from that population. Statistical inference
in this case is usually based on the t distri-
bution (see Howell, 2010), but alternative
modes of inference can be used (e.g., boot-
strapping). The null hypothesis we aim
to reject here is that the “true” correla-
tion coefficient (ρ) is 0 in the population.
When the concomitant t-test is significant,
we reject this null hypothesis, in favor of
the alternative hypothesis that the “true”
correlation coefficient is different from 0
[H(a): ρ = 0].
With cross-cultural correlations,
researchers attempt to reject the null
hypothesis of no association between these
variables at a macrolevel level, i.e., country,
region, or state level. This is where statis-
tical inference can become problematic:
the observations now consist of coun-
tries, states, regions, cultures, or other
macrolevel units. In general, there is a
relatively small, finite number of these
units. It is unlikely that there will be more
independent observations in the future.
This is unlike observations from rolling
a dice, for example, where we can con-
tinue to roll a dice, and gather ever more
observations. As an example, Thornhill
and Fincher (2011) present data on 48
US states, while the finite population
of observations arguably consists of 50
US states (51 if we are lenient and grant
Puerto Rico state status). In this case, the
authors have thus sampled 48 out of the
possible 50(/51) potential observations.
It is unlikely, that there will be more US
states for which we want to make statis-
tical inferences. Even if there were, these
“new states” would likely not be indepen-
dent from the existing ones. In addition,
it seems unreasonable to assume that the
population of observations is anything else
than US states, because this is the unit of
observation being sampled (and if this is
not the unit of observation, then authors
should be explicit what the unit is which
they are sampling and consequently wish
to make statistical inferences about). In
short, in this particular case the authors
have sampled over 90% of the observable
population and in such a case the use of
statistical inference can be questioned.
Of course, it is still useful to describe
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the association via a correlation coeffi-
cient, but a p-value makes little sense,
as the sample very closely matches the
entirety of the population, which we want
to make inferences about. As an analogy, if
I sampled 90% of all males in Amsterdam,
then it makes little sense to still rely on p-
values for making statistical inferences on
all males from Amsterdam. Of course, it
makes good sense to still describe the data
via statistics such as the mean, standard
deviation, median, etc., but we can ques-
tion the use of a p-value, when a sample
very closely matches the population.
In some cases, (for example, Kanazawa,
2006; DeBruine et al., 2011; Eppig et al.,
2011), actually allUS states have been sam-
pled. In such a case, a p-value is entirely
nonsensical, as the sample matches the
population of possible observations, i.e.,
all US states. To return to the analogy of
sampling adult males from Amsterdam, in
this case we have the full 100% of the
population and there simply is no use for
statistical inference: the population is fixed
and we have sampled all of the possi-
ble cases. There is no probability. Again,
it is still useful to describe the associ-
ations found via correlation coefficients,
for example, but statistical inference is
unwarranted when the entire population is
sampled.
The same argument on the value of sta-
tistical inference when the sample closely
matches the population, holds for other
aggregate units such as nation states or
countries: the maximum number of coun-
tries in the world is finite [193 (United
Nations, 2013) to 195 (U.S. Department
of State, 2012) or 196 (Taiwan, included),
depending on definitions] and if we
have sampled close to all of them, then
statistical inference makes little sense.
Other aggregate units such as geopo-
litical regions (Hofstede, 2001), cultural
units (e.g., Human Relations Area Files,
Naroll, 1967; Lagacé, 1974, 1979), cultures
(e.g., Standard Cross-Cultural Sample,
Murdock and White, 1969), regions are
also finite and we should think carefully
about what the population of observa-
tions consists of in these cases and how a
given sample relates to the population. In
some cases, such as geopolitical regions [68
in case of Hofstede (2001)], regions [98
for Fincher et al. (2008)] the population
of observations should conceivably be
less than maximum of 196 states which
exist and we can question whether “new”
regions will ever exist or whether the
number of regions should be treated
as the complete population of possible
observations.
Figure 1 shows some examples of the
number of observations sampled out of
the (reasonable) maximum possible num-
ber of observations (data from Kanazawa,
2006; DeBruine et al., 2010, 2011; Eppig
et al., 2010, 2011; Letendre et al., 2010;
Hruschka and Henrich, 2013). It is by no
means a complete set but is merely meant
as an illustration of the issue I outlined.
As can be seen in some cases, for exam-
ple DeBruine et al. (2010), a p-value could
still be useful, when the sample size is rel-
atively small as opposed to the population.
However, when there is a large or complete
overlap between the number of observa-
tions in and the total number of potential
observations, we can question the use of a
p-value.
For ease of comprehension, I have out-
lined the argument above based on the
p-value, but the issue I outlined actu-
ally already arises with the calculation
of the standard error (SE) (see Isserlis,
1918; Levy, 2005; Lavrakas, 2008). For
finite samples a correction factor should
be applied to the SE, the finite popula-
tion correction factor:
√
(N − n)
(N − 1) , whereby
N is the population size and n is the size
of the sample. When this correction factor
is not applied, SE and therefore p is not
correctly calculated. In the extreme case
when N = n, this correction factor, and
therefore the SE in question, will be 0.
FIGURE 1 | Some examples of papers with the number of observations and the maximum
number of observations. This is a non-exhaustive list of examples to illustrate the issue at hand.
[The cases for Hruschka and Henrich (2013) are the lowest N used in the paper].
A potential reason why some
researchers in this area would rely on sta-
tistical inference in certain cases, where
they should not, could be that they assume
that statistical inferences are necessary
because their measures (such as IQ for
example) have some degree of uncertainty.
However, the uncertainty of the measure
does not call for statistical inference when
all observations are given. Researchers
could be mixing up the error associated
with measurement for a variable such as
IQ at an aggregate level with statistical
inference of a relationship between aggre-
gate units. Inference of a variable based on
a sample (e.g., how well does this sample
represent IQ of Wyoming?) is obviously
different from inference on the relation-
ship between variables at state level (Is
there a statistical relationship between IQ
and variable Y at state level?). Regardless
of the measurement error of a variable,
the “true” statistical relationship is certain
when the population is completely sam-
pled: no statistical inference can be made
in such a case and therefore p is obsolete.
An additional possible reason for
incorporating p-values when they are
unwarranted could be that there are
“political” reasons for ritualistically rely-
ing on them, perhaps as they provide
dichotomous answers to research ques-
tions (also see Cohen, 1994; Hoekstra
et al., 2006). Editors and reviewers can
insist on reporting these p-values even
when they seem unwarranted and even in
the light of frequent calls for alternatives
(e.g., Wilkinson, 1999), we continue to
heavily rely on them.
Frontiers in Psychology | Evolutionary Psychology and Neuroscience October 2013 | Volume 4 | Article 734 | 2
Pollet p-values and aggregated cross-cultural data
In conclusion, in this brief opinion arti-
cle I questioned the use of p-values when
the sample consists of aggregate data and
the sample of observations closely matches
the range of possible observations. I rec-
ommend that p-values are more critically
assessed when applied to macrolevel cross-
cultural correlations but acknowledge that
there can be many constraints which can
lead to their continued usage.
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